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RECENT DECISIONS
Trade Regulations - Price Discriminations - Good Faith De-
fense-Respondent, a corporation primarily engaged in the manu-
facture, distribution, and sale of a national alcoholic beverage beer, re-
duced its regular premium price to the level charged by competitive
producers of "local" beer while maintaining regular prices in the rest
of the country. Respondent was charged with price discrimination in
violation of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act.' Respondent based its defense on Section 2(b)
of the act, contending that the price reduction was made in good faith
to meet an equally low price of a competitor. Held: A nation-wide
brewer's reduction of its "premium" price in the St. Louis area to the
level of prices charged by local breweries in competition with which
it has already been steadily increasing its share of the beer market can-
not be justified as a good faith reduction to meet competition and there-
fore exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act's 2 price discrimination
ban. Respondent ordered to stop reducing beer prices in any market
where it competes with others unless it promotionally reduces prices
everywhere. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep., para. 26,705
(1957).
Federal Trade Commissioner Tait found that respondent, by not
making price reductions anywhere else in the United States similar to
those made in the St. Louis area, had discriminated in price as between
purchasers differently located. An injurious effect on competition with-
in the meaning of Section 2(a) 3 was found in evidence that during the
price reduction period, total St. Louis market area sales increased by
only 9.2% while respondent enjoyed an increase of 201.5% (a tripling
of its previous sales) at the expense of its three main competitors who
suffered losses in their volume of sales of 41%, 33%,, and 1% respec-
tively. There was also evidence that respondent's share of the total St.
Louis market rose from 12.5% to 39.3% during the eight month price
reduction period.
'49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(a) (1946). Section 2(a) provides in part
as follows: "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality,
where either or any of the purchasers involved in such discrimination are in
commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States or any territory thereof or the District of Columbia
or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of
either of them:. . .
2 Ibid.
3 ibd.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The principal issue raised was whether respondent was entitled to
a finding that its price reductions were made in good faith to meet the
equally low price of a competitor within the meaning of the defense
provision of Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 4
The commissioner found that respondent's price reductions in the
St. Louis market were not made in good faith to meet an equally low
price of its competitors. This finding was based on two separate
grounds: first, that the price reductions were not made in self-defense
against competitive attacks. None of the St. Louis competitors con-
stituted any threat to respondent's relative position in the St. Louis
market. Secondly, respondent's beer could and previously did command
a "premium price" in the St. Louis market as well as in most of the
other markets in the nation and therefore any price cut that would
lessen this "established price differential" would not be a meeting of
competition but an undercutting of competition:5
"The test in such a case is not necessarily a difference in
quality but the fact that the public is willing to buy the product
at a higher price in the normal market. Clearly, therefore, re-
spondent's reduction from the premium price to match the prices
of regional beers on the market was not a meeting of competition.
The effect was to undercut competition." [Emphasis Added.]
The instant decision lays down a negative answer to the question
of whether the defense within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the
Robinson-Patman Act is available to a seller who meets a competitor's
lower price in order to obtain new customers. Yet nothing in the lan-
guage of Section 2(b) restricts the defense only to situations where
price reductions are necessary to retain existing customers. The Coin-
missioner relies on dicta in Standard Oil Co. v. FTCnfor his interpre-
449 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(b) (1952). Section 2(b) provides as fol-
lows: "(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this
section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities fur-
nished, the burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing
justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section,
and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is au-
thorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie
case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services
or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor."
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep., para. 26,705 at p. 36,332 (1957).
6 Standard Oil, to meet a competitors price, sold gasoline to four wholesalers in
the Detroit area at a lower price than it charged retail dealers. The wholesalers
passed on much of this saving to their customers who were then able to under-
cut the retail dealers purchasing directly from Standard Oil. The Commission
originally held that Section 2(b) merely prescribed the sequence of evidence
and was not a subsequent justification of an otherwise illegal price discrimina-
tion. 41 F.T.C.253 (1945), -nodified, 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1949). On appeal, however, the Supreme Court held that Section
2(b) is a subsequent defense to a charge of price discrimination and remanded
the case for a finding on Standard Oil's good faith. 340 U.S. 231 (1951.).
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tation of the section. Limiting this defense in such a manner places a
difficult burden upon a seller attempting to come within Section 2(b)
of proving who are his "existing customers." This entails the pres-
entation of past records such as contracts, vouchers, and bills of sale.'
In many circumstances, such as those in the instant fact situation where
existing customers are a multitude of individual purchasers, presentation
of such evidence becomes extremely difficult if not impossible. After
establishing his existing customers, the seller must then prove that the
loss of their patronage was due to the lower price of a competitor.
Under this interpretation, an ambitious nation-wide seller who is not
hurt by a lower price of his local competitor can improve his market
position only by a proportional reduction of prices across the nation or
through the use of non-price competition such as increased advertising.
It is not only uneconomical and impractical for a nation-wide reduction
but such an action may also raise the possibility of other anti-trust
violations." Non-price methods of competition are very often ineffective.
The instant action is an example of the inequities which arise from
restricting the defense within Section 2(b) to the retaining of exist-
ing customers. Respondent, prior to its price reductions, ranked last in
the relative share of the St. Louis. market. This fact in itself makes
the Commissioner's denial of the Section 2(b) defense on the ground
that none of respondent's competitors constituted any threat to re-
spondent's relative position in the St. Louis market, an inequitable de-
cision. The Commissioner evidently overlooked respondent's last place
position when rendering his opinion. Respondent's total sales volume
was slowly improving, but so was the sales volume of one of its main
low priced competitors. Respondent, probably finding that a nation-wide
price reduction would be impractical and non-price methods of com-
petition were ineffective, chose to lower its prices to that of its local
competitors, thereby allowing the quality of its product to improve its
last place market position. While the sales of two competitors who
had previously been experiencing sales declines, fell 33% and 41%
respectively, the third competitor showed slightly less than a 1% de-
crease during the price reduction period. Although there is no specific
Thereupon, the FTC held that Standard Oil had not acted in good faith and
the Section 2(b) defense was precluded, because of the Commission's deter-
mination that Standard's reduced prices were made pursuant to a price system
rather than being "the result of departures from a non-discriminatory price
scale." 49 F.T.C. 923. The Court of Appeals found, however, that there was
no basis in the record for such a finding and vacated the order of the commis-
sion. holding that Standard's good faith defense was fiirmly established. 233F. 2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
decision. 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
7Aspey, Establishing Meeting of Competition Defense to A Charge of Price
Discrimination Under the Robinson-Pahnan Act, 3 Practical Lawyer 56 (1957).
8 See Austern, Inconsistencies in the Law, CCH Business Practices Symposium
158, 163-164 (1951).
1958]
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indication why the one competitor suffered no substantial injury, specu-
lation suggests that the answer was in the quality of his product. This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the lower priced competitor
immediately shot ahead into the lead in the St. Louis market upon the
Commissioner's disallowance of respondent's aggressive price reduction.
Assuming the truth of the speculation, it would seem that a price re-
duction by a higher priced competitor who could not prove his price
reductions were necessitated for the purpose of retaining existing cus-
tomers would substantially injure only low priced competitors with
products somewhat inferior in quality.
The Attorney-General's Committee favored extending the defense
of Section 2(b) to price discriminations made to obtain new customers.9
The instant decision also spotlights the fact that even if respondent
could prove it reduced prices to retain existing customers, it still must
come within the Commissioner's interpretation of the Section 2(b)
clause "to meet an equally low price of a competitor." According to
the Commissioner, the clause is not to be taken literally by the "pre-
mium price" sellers. Such sellers are not allowed to reduce their prices
to the same level as that of their low price competitors but must
maintain the "established price differential" previously existing be-
tween their products. If we carry this interpretation to its converse
extension, a non-premium priced seller who is hurt by a price reduction
of a premium price seller should be allowed to reduce his price below
that of the premium price seller by the amount of the previously es-
tablished price differential. Prior to the instant decision, the Federal
Trade Commission has only as dicta indicated that the premium priced
seller is not acting in good faith if he lowers his price to the same level
as that of a lesser known competitor.' 0
This writer believes that the "established price differential" inter-
pretation as laid down in the instant decision should be reversed. Un-
less the Commisioner is willing to create exceptions in abnormal mar-
kets, if a premium price seller would lose existing customers through
an extrinsic economic cause such as a general depression wherein the
majority of the buyers could only afford the lower priced product, said
seller would not be able to regain former customers since he would be
forced to maintain the established price differential. In addition, there
may be much merit in one author's theory that a low priced seller can
in effect set the prices of the premium-priced seller, under the com-
missioner's present interpretation, thus achieving the undesirable ob-
jectives of conspiratorial price fixing." By allowing a premium-priced
9 Report of Attorney General's Committee To Study the Anti-Trust Laws at
p. 184.
10 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, at 396-397 (1948). Also
see F.T.C. v. Standard Brands, 189 F.2d 510, at 514 (1945).
"Simon, Legal Price Fixing, CCH Business Practice Symposium 83 at 86 (1951).
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seller to reduce his prices to the exact level of his low priced com-
petitor, quality of product would be the chief factor of competition to
the benefit of the general public. This is compatible with the policy
embodied in our anti-trust laws of maintaining flexible prices within
the economy.
CONCLUSION
There is a, definite need for an amendment to the defense contained
within Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The defense should
be made available to a seller who uses price discrimination to obtain a
new customer as well as to a seller who uses such price discrimination
to retain existing customers. This writer suggests the test should be
whether the seller asserting the defense has shown his good faith in
that he acted as a reasonably prudent businesman in securing the new
buyer and was not motivated by a desire to drive competition out of
the market. Section 2(b) should also be amended to allow a seller to
meet the equally low price of a competitor without regard to the main-
tenance of customary price differentials.
ERWIN JAMES KEUP
Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act Held Not An Anti-
Trust Law-Plaintiff alleged that it was injured by defendant's
sales at unreasonably low prices, and that defendant's conduct violated
Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act. Plaintiff sued for treble
damages and injunctive relief under Section Four and Section Sixteen
of the Clayton Act, claiming that the defendant had violated an anti-
trust law. The United States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision,
Held: that Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act was not an
anti-trust law, and the plaintiff, therefore, could not maintain under
Sections Four and Sixteen of the Clayton Act a private civil action for
treble damages and injunctive relief. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation
Co., 78 Sup. Ct. 352 (1958).
The above problem has been before the courts for the past twenty
years. Some decisions have agreed with the majority in the present
case and other decisions have sided with the dissenting opinion holding
that Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act is an anti-trust law.
Considering the importance of this issue and the amount of authority
on either side, it is surprising that the Supreme Court did not pass
on this sooner.
Section Four of the Clayton Act' permits one who is injured by
reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws to bring a suit for
treble damages, and Section Sixteen2 of the Clayton Act allows the
claimant to obtain injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage
1 15 U.S.C. §15 (1914).
215 U.S.C. §26 (1914).
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